Showing posts with label academia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label academia. Show all posts

Thursday, March 10, 2011

Thoughts on Teaching

Making the transition from student to teacher is not something one hears a lot about. Indeed, it is one of the many silences upon which academia thrives. One obvious reason is that most professors at top research universities do not care about teaching. The other is the notion that teaching skills develop with experience, so there's not a great deal that can be shared or taught to those teaching in their early years. To top it off, we often hear that it's all a matter of style and taste anyway. 

At Yale, much like at other universities, all three reasons justify the deafening silence over teaching. It is true that mandatory workshops facilitate conversations among teaching assistants of varying levels of seniority. But in these workshops and outside, a revealing dynamic of "us" versus "them" becomes most apparent. Ph.D students frequently speak of undergraduates as if they are an inferior species, a protected one though. Mostly, the problem here is jealousy. Why do they get so much attention here? How can they, unlike us, have so much fun? And when it's not jealousy, it's sheer pedantry. How could they not know about that article that my adviser asked me to read last week? Why am I teaching kids who don't know Derrida by heart? For these reasons, most graduate student conversations about teaching are, to my mind, damningly unhelpful. 

At a recent workshop organized by the Graduate Writing Center, I repeatedly heard about the need to "manage one's relationship with undergraduate students." A curious phrase, I wondered. Do the speakers "manage" all of their relationships? What would such a social world look like? Pretty dismal, I imagine. That's because all relationships, I think, rest on a two-way street on which trust and empathy ply. In the typical student-teacher relationship, there's something beyond a contractual bond (or a fellowship requirement). It is far easier to engage ideas and hone critical intellectual skills in an atmosphere of friendliness, trust, and empathy than in a stultified professional one.  Minimally, such an atmosphere goes beyond the classroom. It means getting to know students as individuals with distinct likes and dislikes, strengths and weaknesses that reveal themselves in class and on assignments. It also means getting them to know your likes and dislikes, strengths and weaknesses. You cannot just "manage" your way through teaching as if you were a professional zombie. 

But there is more. Students value teachers who are in total command over the course material and can communicate it in the simplest manner possible. It is, after all, a hierarchical relationship, not one between equals. At the very least, students expect someone who demonstrates thorough knowledge over the teaching material. I cannot see this as an unfair expectation. If I paid 40,000 dollars per year to go to college, each course costs me roughly 5,000 dollars. Besides this solid economic reason, there's also the small matter of college being a place of learning. And students want to not just try out new ideas, subjects, and skills, but want to be free to make mistakes along the way. Learning is an interactive process. We can all remember our favorite teachers who made it worth going to class every time. Why don't we try to emulate what they did right then? 

The answer, I'd like to suggest, has to do almost entirely with the professionalizing tendencies in academic life today. By professionalization, I mean a form of commodification of academic labor, which can be ranked hierarchically according to where one's Ph.D granting institution, place of work, citation index ranking, and number of publications. As graduate students are groomed to take their place in professional academia, they naturally imbibe the bad habits of their professors. At least one professor in my department has been known to say that it pays to be a bad teacher. This is careerism, that classic bourgeois malaise we once assumed lay outside the groves of academia. 

For graduate students, the obvious implication of careerism is to "know the relevant literature" than know about a particular subject. Jargon-free communication of one's ideas and insights is besides the point. It's hardly surprising that, anyone buying into the dominant ideology of graduate school today is a pretty miserable human being. The poor graduate student, walled up in the ivory tower, lacks any meaningful sense what's going on outside. A needless cynicism takes root and is the necessary companion of the professional-in-the-making. 

I once assumed anthropologists were among the few academics who ventured out of campus sufficiently often to acquire a deeper understanding of the world we live in. Alas, now I find that they are prone to bouts of messianism, in which old prophets such as Foucault and Deleuze are replaced by the likes of Agamben and Zizek. Immersion in lifeworlds other than one's own is unfashionable. One can "explain" anecdotes collected from the "field" with one's favorite theorist in hand. This is divination, the misguided idea that a prophet or his teachings can show us the true way. Faced with such humbug, the joy of learning dies an unnatural death. What can one teach others if one's own learning is restricted to imbibing the ideas of the latest prophet on the block? 

The graduate student thus emerges as a beleaguered being, alienated from the world of which the undergraduate is very much a part. Teaching is no more than a chore. One can never approach it enthusiastically. Or engage with students without "managing" one's relationship with them. Undergraduates are there to be looked down upon contemptuously. This entire attitude, I think, short-circuits the college education process. Furthermore, it impoverishes graduate student life even further. 

Instead of ending on a dire note, let me do so with an email sent by a student of mine at the end of the fall semester. It encapsulates all the points I've made thus far. And more crucially, it gives us every reason to take teaching seriously:

On 14 December 2010 02:07, (name and email address omitted) wrote:

Uday,

As I began to express to you as I was leaving the exam today, there is no way for me to accurately articulate my gratitude to you for your devotion and patience with me this semester. I read over my first and last papers after the test, and I have to say, the missing link between the two is the endless help and guidance that you have given me throughout the semester. From the beginning of the semester when I got that first paper back, I told myself that Political Philosophy was going to be the class that I spend the most time on, because writing has historically been my weakness. Having now achieved this goal, I can say confidently that you were the best teacher that I could had had to help me with my aspiration. You challenged me to participate in class, make thoughtful comments, and ultimately translate those thoughts onto paper. For me, what separated this class from all the others is that when I would get a paper assignment, I wouldn’t bemoan the task ahead of me, but rather I would get excited at the notion of having another opportunity to have my writing critiqued, edited and improved.

The single-handed most impressive and important part of my working with you this semester was that you were seemingly just as committed as I was to improving me as a writer. In the past, when I have met with my teachers with writers block or other problems, they would take five to ten minutes and try to point me in a direction that they thought would be helpful. However, when I wouldn’t understand something, the response that I commonly received was, “That’s for you to figure out,” leaving me somewhat unsatisfied with our time spent. With you, however, our meetings lasted sometimes an hour a half. You struck the balance of making me understand exactly what I needed to do to be successful, but at the same time leaving enough room for me to be creative with my thinking. This method was instrumental to my truly enjoying writing. For the first time in my academic career, I really felt that I was able to master the analytical and writing skills that are required for writing a paper.

Regardless of my grade on the final or in the class, I know that I am walking away from this class a better writer, thinking, and analyst. Whereas most classes hope to provide you with some knowledge to take with you into the future, I have gained not only the knowledge of political philosophy, but also the understanding a confidence to write and analyze.

Like I said, there is absolutely no way for me to do justice to express my gratitude to you, so I figured that a letter would be the best alternative.

Have a safe flight and a good break, and hopefully see you next semester.

(Name omitted to ensure confidentiality)

Monday, November 22, 2010

What's Wrong With My Generation?

In the fall of 2002, I started college in Grinnell, Iowa. I opted for a liberal arts education over a specialized degree in economics at St. Stephens', Delhi, because it promised to open up an intellectual universe that encouraged learning for learning's sake. Over the past eight years, however, I have tended to harbor mixed feelings on what I see and experience on campuses. As I have enjoyed and profited from the company of outstanding teachers and peers, I've nonetheless found myself at odds with so many others. My generation invented Facebook and made it a runaway success, but it lost something along the way. We can stay in touch online with friends and family, but we have lost the art of conversation. We can write computer code or blogs, but we have lost the pleasures of penning a persuasive argument. We read emails and news articles all day, but we have lost the joys of reading books that open our minds to hitherto unknown worlds. We seek power and profit or pleasure and expressiveness in all we do, but we lack a sense of purpose. So what's wrong with my generation?

Perhaps it's wisest to begin with introspection. How many of you write every day? No, I don't mean emails or post-its! I mean writing to yourself, your friends or anyone else who cares to read. By writing, I mean expressing oneself in a creative yet disciplined way on a subject that matters to you. That takes out most blogs, twitter and Facebook updates, essay assignments, and grant applications. And when you do write, do you reflect long on a word or strive for succinctness? Or has writing (or typing) merely becoming a kind of expressive act on the one hand and a chore on the other? Most importantly, do you enjoy writing? Do you usually complain of writer's block or do you get thrilled at the prospect of penning down your thoughts in a structured way? If we consider the average person born between 1980 and 1995, I think, the answers are pretty straightforward: either writing is a necessary evil required in college and beyond or it is a purely expressive act in which anything goes. Of course, there's no "right" response here, but isn't it worth pondering what our responses today might reveal?

In the spirit of that question, let's consider reading. What do you read? Emails? Newspapers and magazines? Harry Potter? Dan Brown? Jared Diamond? And why do you read? Simply because you need to check the news and your inbox? Or because fantasy worlds appeal to you? You might say it's impossible to find time to read for pleasure nowadays; there's just so much work to do at home and at work. Fair enough, I'd say, but you do watch TV, surf the Net, spend hours on Facebook, and so forth. Surely, you could read for pleasure now and then when you get the time. And when you do read, would you read slowly like we sip wine? Or would you skim through the pages of a novel much like you'd down a beer in a jiffy? Lastly, if one were to ask you to recall what you read, what would you remember? The plot, the characters, and the author's turn of phrase? Or merely that it's something about the world of wizards or the mischief of the Catholic Church? Again, for those of you born between 1980 and 1995, I am not so interested in what your specific answer might be, but in the overall patterns we can start to discern here.

Broadly speaking, I find there are two sets of responses: Utilitarian and Sentimentalist. The Utilitarian sees reading and writing as means to some worldly end. It might be grades, jobs, grants, or just name-dropping at a social gathering. Formal education in schools and colleges is, as economists say, an "input" that serves to produce the finished product: an industrious, rational self-interested calculator who minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. To speak of learning for the sake of learning before such a person is to invite ridicule and scorn. Wake up to the 21st century, they yell, and get yourself a Master's in some technical subject so that you can earn a six-figure salary within the next five years!

On the contrary, the Sentimentalist sees no pleasures in industry, rationality or calculation. These are far too bourgeois-rational for, say, someone deep into Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. They say: let's save the planet, stop making war, organize concerts for starving Third Worlders, and lead authentic lives. The world is bereft of goodness and kindness, they argue further, so we must dream and express ourselves online and offline to our friends. Art is expression; words are expression. Academia attracts such people en masse because it offers healthcare benefits and a stable middle-class life without hard work. Joblessness also attracts such people en masse because it is the lot of artists and hippies to revel in the slings and arrows of bourgeois society. But if one suddenly stop a sentimentalist to ask about reading and writing, one should expect mumbles and incoherent phrases. Conversation, after all, is not to be expected of someone who knows that anti-war protests and Habitat for Humanity are the hallmarks of the authentic life.

College and graduate students overwhelmingly fall into one of these two categories. Or sometimes even in both? Arguably, the finest example of my generation is Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of Facebook. If you know anything about him or saw the fictionalized account of his life in The Social Network, you'll know what I'm talking about. Here is a person who is exceedingly smart and ambitious, much like our Utilitarians on campus, but his relationships with his friends are notably shallow and his speech resembles monologues rather than conversation. But he is also a creator, an entrepreneur, someone who avidly reads ancient Greek philosophy and advocates Stoicism in a money-obsessed age. He could be any of your restive nerdy/geeky friends from college, except that he's the world's youngest billionaire. But he doesn't converse, read or write much beyond what's minimally required of him. And it doesn't prevent him from doing well for himself!

If you've read until this point, you might have guessed what I'm talking about. It is not that my generation has mastered non-verbal communication or their auditory skills as substitutes for reading and writing. They have instead opted for shallowness and superficiality. What is true of your peer in the comparative literature doctoral program is also quite true of your banker friend on Wall Street. Education is a means to an end. In other words, the Utilitarian must try to maximize his job prospects by writing and reading minimally, and the Sentimentalist must simply re-affirm her naive moral convictions in what she reads and finds. Vast worlds are shut off for these blinkered individuals. It is not merely the pleasures of the mind that are out of vogue, but an experiential understanding of the world around us. It is now possible to study economics or politics without paying attention to the homeless people on the streets. It is now possible to protest against the US war on terror while retaining Bush-like stereotypes of Muslims as intolerant, irrational, pre-modern bigots. It is now possible to earn a lot of money or hold many degrees without a clear sense of purpose in life. It is now possible to socialize without listening to others. It is now possible to love without affection, live without values, and learn without passion.

Something is very nearly lost forever in our world: intellectual depth and moral seriousness. You cannot expect someone who drinks fair-trade coffee at Starbucks to earn "good karma" to be anything but shallow and superficial. Everything is a means to an end: relationships, knowledge, clothes, speech, food. But what good is such instrumentalism, whether it is Utilitarian or Sentimentalist? Can it help us understand the world and ourselves better? Can it help us change our world ever so slightly by our actions? Can it make us better human beings? None of these ends require a higher education degree. Indeed, there might be much to learn from those who are less fortunate than us economically and educationally. But how can a well-schooled upper-middle class teenager today take someone less privileged seriously? Our social inferiors are either to be despised or pitied, depending on your ideological convictions. The world is, as VS Naipaul wrote famously, what it is, so my generation simply choose to extend their middle-class privileges in corporate, government or academic spheres. Restive yet unmindful of what is missing, they affirm their commitment to cynicism and moral flippancy. Now where do we go from here?

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Three Modes of Graduate Student Being

1) Graduate school is a perpetual struggle in a Hobbesian state of nature. Why am I here? Why am I doing this? Course readings overwhelm; professors intimidate; funding runs low; research topics run dry; job prospects look bleak. Life is real, life is earnest (except that this is the ivory tower!). Perhaps it's pointless anyway. Sigh! Life, research, struggle, graduate school...

End state: Professor at Alaskan community college with more or less the same complaints.

2) Graduate school is meant for those who got good grades in high school and college because they were teacher's pets. It's a safe job for those of us who never want to leave school and enter the "real world." What's all this intellectual talk about? At seminars and elsewhere, learn to drop names: Foucault, Bourdieu, Agamben, and, er, your advisor. Read the "literature" on whatever your advisor does, and then suck up, copy his methods, and extend his argument by a thousandth of a decimal point. Academic research is incremental. Science proceeds this way. Heck, that's what the journals are about!

End state: Tenured professor at old graduate school with a chair named after advisor.

3) Graduate school is inspiring and rewarding as long as one is willing to work hard. Serious intellectual effort is valuable for its own sake. Advisors are role models, even heroes, but not gods. Publishing journal articles and presenting papers at conferences are fine, but the key is to enjoy debate and discussion, learning and teaching. Academia is itself part of the real world, embodying every form of hierarchy and discrimination outside it. Studying important issues in society and teaching college students are important ways to set things right just a wee bit.

End state: Unemployed writer or activist.

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

The Pleasures of the Intellect

This post takes its inspiration from Robert Pippin's recent essay in the NY Times. Pippin calls for a renewed focus on the intellectual pleasures of reading, research, and writing beyond the many kinds of THEORY that the knowledge factory churns out regularly. He calls these pleasures "naive," ostensibly because they are innocent of theoretical pretensions. But they are, if you reflect for a moment, rather sophisticated. In a way, everything we learned in kindergarten is still relevant for us today: the joy of learning new things after protracted struggles; discovering new ideas that challenge our inherited conceptions of the world; experiencing the aesthetic pleasures of reading; creating our own forms of intellectual and artistic expression; basking in our realization of the inexorable complexity of our lives and our world, and thus discovering the limits of our mortality. I find little, if anything, that is naive here.

My teaching experience this semester reminds me unambiguously of the joys of intellectual cultivation, even in an age of social networking sites, PlayStation, and IPhones. It helps that I teach political philosophy to thirty-five bright kids at a leading US university. We read a pretty standard canonical selection of political philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Tocqueville. Some might find it odd and complain that I have succumbed to academic conservatism. Indeed, from a certain position in the "cultural wars" of the past, this is correct. But I think we are smarter now. The canonical writers, we appreciate, speak to us in different voices rather than offer us a coherent sermon, and it is for us to pose challenging questions to them and find our own answers. This is anything but easy. Political philosophers are distant historically and culturally, and difficult to read and comprehend. Only in our minds, however, can the texts and their authors come alive and speak to our deepest concerns and anxieties. This, however, involves the time-honored virtues of close reading, critical thinking, analytical writing, and intelligent discourse/debate.

The idea is not to simply accept what an author or professor says, but to question, to think, and grapple with the texts as much as our own inchoate notions about politics and society. Consider Plato. Everyone sympathizes with Socrates on their first reading of the Apology. That's what Plato intended. And he was a bloody good writer! But there is something more to it. Socrates wishes to lead only the examined life or perish. Yet his pursuit of the examined life is seen by many of his fellow Athenians as impious and corrupting. The innocent reader is led to believe Socrates' defense in the trial. The Delphic Oracle told him to question others and think for himself, so he can't be impious, he says. How could one man, he asks further, corrupt his fellow citizens in a democracy? The innocent are persuaded again by Socrates' personification of the Laws of Athens in the Crito. Surely, one might conclude, Socrates regards himself to be a good citizen, albeit one who stood for free speech and other civil liberties before his time. "He'd be fine today" is the verdict of many first-time readers. But if this is so, there's no point reading Plato except as a historical curiosity from an illiberal era. Let's read instead, some might say, the classics of postmodern thought in our day and satisfy ourselves with the extreme skepticism, uncertainty, and despondence that characterizes so-called late modernity.

However commonplace these views might be in certain academic circles, especially in many humanistic disciplines, it is ultimately nihilistic. That's a problem not for some deep philosophical reason but because it denies the intrinsic, non-instrumental value of reading canonical texts and reflecting on them and one's own political dilemmas. It won't lead to a job, more money, a higher IQ, or sometimes even a higher grade. But Plato still has something valuable to teach us. That teaching lies in Socrates' evasive defense at his public trial and his ironic speech as the Laws. What we find here is exactly the opposite of free speech and other contemporary liberal values: a certain kind of evasiveness or deception alongside a defiant defense of self-knowledge as the highest good. Thinking for oneself and questioning what we are told by others, Plato wishes to tell us, are dangerous activities, especially for the young, ambitious people whom Socrates often encountered as his critics as well as disciples. The truth is that Socrates did indeed reject the authority of the gods of Athens and did corrupt the youth with his irreverent philosophy of life. And he was entirely aware of his "guilt." In this sense, Plato offers a fairly radical critique of the inexorable tension between the self-examining individual and society at large. This is, of course, not a critique lost upon college students, who realize that immersing themselves in textual or empirical studies radically alters their worldview and estranges them from their friends and family.

Is this the only possible interpretation of Plato's portrayal of Socrates? Certainly not. But it is nonetheless an interpretation worth considering alongside many others. Indeed, reading texts with multiple interpretations in mind -- yours and your peers' -- is a valuable intellectual goal in itself. This fits well with what some call the "surplus meaning" of texts. Reading collectively with multiple interpretations in mind, we can learn to discriminate between better and worse interpretations, and to confirm that even the best interpretations might not explain everything. Not everyone will agree, but that simply affirms another basic intellectual truth, the difficulty of agreeing on what is good. Conservatives do not appreciate these finer points. For them, it's merely a matter of studying the so-called classics of Western civilization. That's odd not only on account of Gandhi's statement that "Western civilization would be a good idea," but also because supposedly Western canonical philosophers such as Aristotle were lost for over a millennium and only return to European soil with the great Islamic thinkers of the Middle Ages. And what is so "Western" anyway about the polytheistic Greeks and Romans anyway? Whichever way you look at it, if you want to engage seriously with canonical texts, social conservatism is not an option. The texts are inherently radical insofar as they explode our lazy assumptions about ourselves and our world; they excite and shape our intellectual faculties; and, they predispose us towards not just political ideas but political action. If you had any doubt, consider Socrates' martyrdom, Machiavelli's call to liberate Italy from the oppression of secular and ecclesiastical rulers, or Tocqueville's insistence that social equality rather than political liberty makes for a genuinely democratic age.

My purpose here is twofold: firstly, an emphasis on teaching and studying competing theories cannot accomplish what "naive" reading can; secondly, these "naive" pleasures are actually rather sophisticated. When we focus on different theories of textual criticism or social science, we merely reproduce stale structures of thought, and therefore, unleash tedium and thoughtlessness rather than vibrant intellectual energy and passion. If you ever have doubts on this point, compare the graduate students of your university with the undergraduates. You'll know the difference because college kids don't do literature reviews day in and day out. Likewise, if you reflect on what I've said so far, you might find that "naive" intellectual pleasures are what caused at least some of us to take up the life of the mind as a vocation. But you don't have to be an academic to understand my point here. If you're into business or art or soccer, you might actually understand better what I mean. The pleasures of the self-examined life are remarkably democratic: I have learned my most valuable lessons outside classrooms, from the poorest and most marginalized members of my society, who lack the luxuries of time and luck to read closely and write critically as part of their intellectual training. Yet, despite (or perhaps because of) their rigorous daily labors and numerous social constraints, they speak "naively" but enthusiastically of new modes of intellectual discovery and political expression in a hostile world. Socrates, who never read closely or wrote critically, would have understood, even if most of our university professors cannot.

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

The Seminar Mode of Production: A Critique

Economic categories are only the theoretical expressions, the abstractions of the social relations of production...Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist. The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with the material productivity, produce also principles, ideas, and categories, in conformity with their social relations. Thus the ideas, these categories, are as little eternal as the relations they express. (Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, Chapter Two: "The Metaphysics of Political Economy")

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. (Karl Marx, 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy)


Introduction

I begin with my favorite lines from Marx's corpus of writings in order to set the tone for my argument here. This argument concerns what I call the "seminar mode of production," which, I believe, ought to be seen as a set of economic and social relations that are associated with particular forms of consciousness in our world today. This mode of production may be observed primarily in universities and research centers, but its influence is not merely confined to these peripheries of modern society. Indeed, insofar as a university degree is widely considered a necessity by middle and upper classes worldwide, the influence of the university, and by extension, of the seminar mode of production, may be seen everywhere. This mode of production, therefore, along with the social relations of production associated with it, is the object of critique in this post.


So what exactly is the "seminar mode of production"? It is the sum of the productive forces and social relations that exist between administrators, donors/funders, professors and students in the contemporary world, whose perpetuation depends, in the final analysis, on performing erudition in the physical setting of a seminar room. This definition needs to be parsed a bit. Note three key elements here, each of which will be elaborated upon subsequently.

1. The seminar functions as the crucial setting in which erudition is expected to be performed by students and professors alike. Secondary performances of erudition (by-products?) such as published articles, edited volumes and books, reviewed by peers, are also derived from the same productive relations established within the university. Performance, however, does not necessarily imply feigning erudition since it is quite possible that some performances are genuinely good.

2. The seminar is nestled in the framework of the university, which has increasingly being seen in the postwar era as a knowledge factory to be managed and run by professional administrators. As I shall explain below, this is a fairly recent development in the institutional history of the university, characterized as it is by medieval norms and rituals even today. In other words, what we are witnessing nowadays is the fruition of a post-WWII process of incorporating academia into the larger social relations established under the capitalist mode of production, albeit in a somewhat peculiar way.

3. The production of "knowledge" in seminars across the modern university system occurs parallel to the formation of particular kinds of consciousness among students and professors. These forms of consciousness, as I shall argue, are essentially apolitical, despite appearances to the contrary, and geared to the preservation of bourgeois society and its interests. Moreover, these forms of consciousness (note the plural!) may be associated with distinct socio-cultural processes, most notably (a) co-option into existing power structures of some claiming to represent the subordinated classes, (b) a stable supply of skilled workers for the labor force, whose intrinsically petty bourgeois nature favors preserving the status quo above all else, and (c) the rise of a global neo-brahminical elitism that values higher education degrees as markers of social distinction despite the irony of "subalterns" acting strategically as objects of research.


The Performance of Erudition

By erudition, I mean literally e(x)-rudis or the Latin root for the expulsion of rudeness in personal manners, primarily by the acquisition of what is commonly known as “polish.” In the seminar room, “polish” is typically demonstrated by a combination of everyday strategies: dropping names of famous individuals both alive and dead, references to fashionable theories and tools to suggest a deep familiarity with these, and/or appeals to the rhetoric of science (hypotheses, data, sampling, testing, etc). Jointly or severally, these strategies are used regularly by students and professors across seminar rooms to demonstrate proof of erudition to other participants gathered therein. Taken together, they constitute a collective performance of erudition in the seminar setting.


This collective performance, in fact, lies at the heart of the seminar mode of production. Indeed, the success or failure of productive forces may be judged on the basis of these performances. This holds true not only for students who are graded on their performances, but also for professors, who are evaluated by universities on the basis of their performances of erudition. These evaluations of performance create distinctions of note between students (an “A” student is regarded as different from a “C” student) and professors (a full professor is viewed differently from a junior faculty member). The distinctions created thus are not restricted to classroom settings because students with higher grades end up being hired in better-paid jobs or attending better graduate schools. Likewise, professors promoted to higher ranks of the pecking order enjoy substantive social and material privileges not enjoyed by those below them. Socio-cultural distinctions thus reinforce and are reinforced by material ones.


Of course, performances are not only oral. Performances in written form, such as papers, reports and the like, are just as vital in demonstrating erudition in the seminar setting. In written as well as oral performances of erudition, it is not always possible to distinguish between “genuine” and “fake” though it is possible to separate better from worse performances according to established criteria. Occasionally, I have found it possible to expose a student or faculty presenter (yes, this is true!) at a seminar who has referred to, say, Foucault without actually reading the primary texts. But in most cases, it is exceedingly difficult to tell whether someone quoting Foucault has actually read the relevant texts or has simply faked erudition by reading a few pages of summary online. Faking erudition in this manner is anything but uncommon in seminars. Students do it routinely at both undergraduate and graduate levels. But what is less known is that faculty members do it only slightly less frequently, albeit in more sophisticated or “polished” ways. Usually, professors do so by using the rhetoric of science to cloak their research findings, or by claiming authority based on their privileged access to a particular text or context. Both rhetorical strategies are persuasive enough for most audiences, and erudition can be performed easily under such circumstances.


The emphasis on performance has an obvious casualty: learning. There is no guarantee that the dialogues between student and teacher or between peers lead to a genuine understanding of the topic at hand in a seminar setting. In most cases, the objects of performance are discarded much like fancy dresses as soon as the student (or professor) exits the seminar room. A peer who took a graduate seminar with me in African Politics, therefore, found it easy to make a number of carefully-orchestrated statements on North Atlantic racism hampering serious scholarship on politics and society in Africa. Yet the same student told me outside the classroom on the very same day that she considered Africa as a continent to be “beyond repair” because she deemed its inhabitants to be too corrupt and lazy in general. One can come up with dozens of similar examples after even the slightest acquaintance with the performance-based regime of the seminar room. What is noteworthy is this: whether the student has actually internalized or imbibed what is read and discussed is not deemed as relevant as performing erudition, whether authentic or fake. This, as I shall argue next, is only to be expected in the knowledge factory or the higher education industry, the common names for learning and scholarship regimes in the contemporary world.


The Knowledge Factory

The knowledge factory is, in many ways, akin to a sausage factory. A delivery line of sausage-like products are produced periodically in fixed quantities under clearly-defined quality criteria. These sausage-like students are then absorbed into the capitalist economy based on pre-existing job descriptions and selection criteria. It is a wonderful system, of course, devised in the United States over the post-WWII era to meet the growing demand for goods and services by an expanding “affluent society.” By the early Sixties, the rudiments of the current system were in place. College graduates began to be churned out in large numbers by the assembly line of the knowledge factory. As demand for commodities grew over the past fifty years, the demand for skilled labor rose correspondingly, and the university system came to be streamlined to meet these labor demands. Of course, as the demand for college students grew, so too did the demand for teachers. Accordingly, the number of graduate programs and doctoral degrees rose exponentially over the postwar era. Since quality control of sausages and students is vital to the success of a capitalist economy, the descendants of Puritans sought to “professionalize” various disciplines, generally by making gratuitous use of the rhetoric of science, which is, of course, the religion of our secular age. And thus it came to pass that administrators, managers, and clerks came to find a comfortable home in the university.


The potted history I have just described may be regarded as a brief account of the absorption of academia into the capitalist economy. It seeks to explain why economists, for instance, have come to acquire so much prestige in the corporate sector. Or why economics has become a default standard for the other social sciences, which have striven fruitlessly to “mathematize” or quantify their research despite their actual results being closer to those of astrologers and numerologists than to those of real scientists. Or why those in the natural sciences have focused their energies on devising technologies of different sorts that are socially and ecologically wasteful instead of producing ecologically-sustainable technologies that serve communities and preserve natural resources. The transformation is hard to appreciate today because one is tempted to believe that it was always so. But it wasn’t. That is exactly why it is important to understand the socio-historical changes over the past two generations, alongside an appreciation of the underlying material basis of these changes.


However, the transformation is a peculiar one, certainly not identical to that occurring outside the academic groves. Being a medieval institution, the university could never have undergone an easy transition to modernity. It was elitist, even aristocratic, in its very substance, not merely in the paraphernalia of scepters, robes, gowns and caps. The very structure of academia has always been true to its feudal origins that sought to make numerous marks of distinction within the professoriate as well as the student body. The feudal order also sought to keep out, in the words of a former adviser, the “riff-raff.” To participate in the modern world without becoming an anachronism did indeed seem to be a great challenge to Western universities in the 18th and 19th centuries. No less an authority than Adam Smith suggested that lecturers at Edinburgh ought to be financed by their students instead of being funded publicly, ostensibly to weed out outdated and unfashionable subjects not demanded by the student body. One can imagine how the protectionist racket that is academia must have reacted to Smith’s maverick suggestion. Those were difficult times for the aristocrats in Western European universities (though not in the securely racist, aristocratic milieu of New England universities at the time). By the early 19th century, however, the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie had kissed and made up, a union symbolized definitively by the Great Reform Act of 1832. The compromise ironically involved inventing new forms of snobbery that could be blended imaginatively with older forms. British and French universities ended up creating a new class of pseudo-aristocrats at home and in the colonies abroad. In Victorian Britain, one could certainly buy one’s way to becoming a peer or a civil servant in the East, but universities provided the surest and most secure means to climb up the social ladder and thus, to perform “erudition” in its etymological sense of expelling rudeness.


Those neat pseudo-aristocratic arrangements were nonetheless rend asunder by the two world wars. In WWI, for instance, it is estimated that roughly a third of Oxford’s graduates departed the earthly realm without encashing their privileges of education. Furthermore, the geopolitical shift across the Atlantic had effectively ended the heyday of the traditional Western European university. Oxford and Cambridge were merely vestiges of the Old World in the new scheme of things. Still, Neo-Gothic spires and gargoyles continued to provide solace to cultural conservatives and snobs in the United States. Medieval markers of privilege could be conveniently accommodated within the knowledge factory in order to keep alive the pretense of a continuous Western tradition. Consequently, status and prestige are still determined by medieval norms and rituals even in an overwhelmingly capitalist world. Tenure, that great aristocratic vestige, thus continues to sit uneasily with the modern capitalist dictum of hire-and-fire. And minorities, women, and the subordinated classes of society continue to be poorly represented in universities. In retrospect, none of this is actually paradoxical: modernity depends fundamentally on the strategic use of traditional idioms and icons, and capitalism too needs institutions that transform wealth into status and power. The social relations appropriate to the seminar mode of production are thus somewhat different from the idealized Marxian abstraction of capitalism. The social relations corresponding to the seminar mode accommodate the pre-modern within the modern, the feudal within the capitalist, and the aristocratic within the bourgeois. This is because the university produces not only sausage-like students, but also cultural capital that enhances status and power. The knowledge factory is, in this sense, also a producer of aristocratic badges that awards considerable privileges to their wearers.


Forms of Consciousness and the Social Dynamics in Bourgeois Society

If the university today were merely a knowledge factory in which workers and their apprentices performed erudition, it might have been a fairly innocuous affair. In fact, it is not. The production of “knowledge” in the seminar mode gives rise to particular forms of consciousness among students and professors that are fundamentally apolitical, despite appearances to the contrary, to the extent that they seek to preserve bourgeois society and interests, that is, the status quo. There are three forms of consciousness that deserve to be highlighted. Firstly, there is the worldview of the privileged minority or the “creamy layer” as middle-class Indians call these determined seekers of upward social mobility. In this worldview, education is an input in the production of erudition, literally the expulsion of rudeness, which provides new avenues for employment, wealth, power and status. First-generation college-goers feature in this group as do racial minorities in the United States. What is most interesting is that these minority seekers of privilege actually believe the dominant elite mythology of sophistication, at least outwardly, and act as if it were true. The logic here is pragmatic: the status quo is certain to remain, so it’s best to make peace with the powers-that-be and grab a piece of the power-status-wealth pie.

Secondly, there is the weltanschauung of the plain-vanilla petty bourgeois students, who arguably are the most numerous on any university campus. For these types, education is a “given,” since their parents and grandparents most likely partook of it en route to careers as professionals in the service sector of the economy. These are the men and women who, in due course, comprise the core of the capitalist workforce in any country. Like all young people, petty bourgeois students too are attracted to pop radicalism, usually expressed in the form of peace marches, tree-hugging, anti-war protests, and so on. These are low-risk declarations of their moderately radical temperaments. More intrepid adventurers, of course, choose to volunteer at soup kitchens and churches or even to travel abroad as Peace Corps volunteers. Learning a foreign language, usually a European one, or studying abroad for a semester in a suitably exotic location are fairly common for this type of student. It is not so much that the petty bourgeois types lack a sense of adventure or genuine intellectual interests, but that their worldview is fundamentally limited by an everyday conservatism inherited from their parents and by their own mediocrity that makes every course and every assignment challenging. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge sounds quaint; radical politics seems outrageously risky; public service can be no more than an occasional hobby. In the final analysis, therefore, courses end up being about grades more than intellectual interests, education ends up being a mere cog in the wheel that preserves (or slightly enhances) social status and privilege, and the route from the seminar room leads firmly to the corporate desks of our modern-day Bob Cratchits and Bartlebys.

Finally, there is the oddest of the three forms of consciousness produced and sustained by the modern university system, the neo-brahmnical. It enjoys the greatest prestige because it is the preserve of those who “beat the system.” Professors and students alike share this neo-brahminical consciousness, mainly because the better, brighter students appear to mimic their teachers in the most sincere manner. In this milieu where the feudal/aristocratic is blended smoothly with the modern/capitalist, higher education is recognized principally as a means of acquiring cultural capital, not as an input in the production of erudition. Often, this recognition is linked to the privileged backgrounds of students, who consider themselves to be high-status creatures already, albeit in search of the right kinds of gloss. These kinds of gloss are material, verbal and rhetorical. In material terms, gloss takes the form of the latest and most fashionable gadgetry, cosmetics and clothing, preferably from brands such as Apple, Sephora and Neiman Marcus. In verbal terms, it means an accent that is free from plebeian sounds, pronunciation that is free from colloquial influences, and diction that is free from grammatical errors. In rhetorical terms, it means posturing as champions of the downtrodden and oppressed; forcefully employing the language of rights to side with causes such as genocide in Darfur, sweatshops in Asia, and animal rights; acquiring a vocabulary that readily references academic terms such as “subaltern,” “indigenous peoples,” “deconstruction,” and “social construct.” Dressing and owning certain articles, speaking in a certain way, and using a well-defined set of jargon words are, therefore, the surest means of asserting one’s superiority over others in this “game.” The social relations of production pertinent to the seminar mode entail precisely such markers of sociocultural distinction that definitively define high and low in the university system. These Bourdieusian distinctions exist in the student body on every campus, but interestingly enough, similar markers of differences are to be found among the professoriate too (comparing the average senior and junior professors around you should drive home the point forcefully!). This status game is neo-brahminical since cultural rather than economic capital is its basic currency though the game as a whole is supported by the capitalist economy (thus the prefix “neo-”). The cynical and ironic uses of the underprivileged and their legitimate needs are, of course, intrinsic to the neo-brahminical status game, which is, in its highest form, an elite competition to establish oneself as a supreme do-gooder without actually doing any good. In other words, a form of politics that is actually anti-politics insofar as claiming, without authorization or authenticity, to speak for the subaltern ultimately neglects, even mocks, any attempt by subalterns to speak and act as meaningful agents of social change.

It is not difficult to appreciate that these three forms of consciousness associated with privileged minorities, the petty bourgeoisie and the neo-brahmins are linked to three distinct sociocultural processes in the North Atlantic world. The privileged minority consciousness leads to a gradual co-option into existing power structures of those claiming to represent traditionally-subordinated groups on the basis of their ascriptive identities. The petty bourgeois worldview leads to a steady supply of skilled workers into the capitalist workforce due to the limited talents and ambitions of this population. Lastly, the neo-brahminical consciousness leads to higher education continuing to be a means of gaining cultural capital, status and prestige through the strategic use of high-minded rhetoric concerning the oppressed and the suffering, and the subsidization of traditional privileges by the capitalist economy.

Each of these three social processes, it must be understood, buttresses and reinforces the other. The co-option of privileged minorities into power structures supports the status quo, whether in the capitalist economy or in the university system, by preventing radical pressures from below to rise to a boil. The steady supply of petty bourgeois workers into the service sector is the engine of growth and/or stability in the capitalist economy, which thereby makes it possible to write off the costs of co-opting privileged minorities and supporting the neo-brahminical status game. And the neo-brahminical emphasis on cultural rather than economic capital legitimizes the entire capitalist system by invoking an imaginary, unbroken elite tradition of Western civilization. There is thus a neat complementarity to these three seemingly distinct forms of consciousness and social processes that owe their origins to the seminar mode of production.

Conclusion

In a functionalist vein, one might be tempted to argue that the seminar mode of production nourishes a social system that is stable, self-regulating, and internally coherent. Such a perspective, however, neglects the considerable imperfections in the social relations of production established within the knowledge factory itself and its relationship to the wider capitalist system. Within the university system, one ought to acknowledge the presence of a limited set of dissenters and heretics who do not toe the line defined by the authorities. Their everyday conduct is transgressive in subtle and not-so-subtle ways though open confrontation is hardly a prudent option for either students or professors. These transgressors may choose to use the grading system subversively to reward genuine learning rather than mere performance; to enable students to partake of the sheer joy of reading poetry, understanding how the past illuminates the present, or making scientific discoveries rather than to preoccupy themselves with jobs or jargon; and, to avail of the advantages of experiential learning to silently challenge received wisdom, and perhaps even the seminar mode itself. In sum, we are not in The Matrix, and it is quite possible for teachers and students to be subversive/ transgressive in covert and less overt ways. Whether they do so or not, in fact, thus becomes a matter of individual choice that we should not wish away via a structurally over-determined explanation.

Just as there are crevices for dissent, subversion and transgression within the knowledge factory, so too are there contradictions in the relationship between the knowledge factory and the capitalist economy. The overproduction of doctoral students relative to available jobs in the humanities and social sciences is one symptom of these contradictions. Another symptom is the growing joblessness of college graduates in depressed economic conditions. Yet the most obvious symptom of the uneasy place of the seminar mode of production in the capitalist economy is the commonplace notion that universities are ivory towers that promote outdated or other-worldly thinking ill-suited to the needs of contemporary capitalism. This is a rather amusing notion when one considers the tortured history of a medieval institution trying to reform itself in the modern world. After all, the modern university or knowledge factory owes its existence to private and public capital, and in turn, keeps the wheels of the capitalist economy moving by releasing a steady supply of inputs for productive activities.

The contradictory, awkward relationship between the knowledge factory and the capitalist economy also point to a larger malaise within contemporary capitalism itself. This has, of course, been revealed most dramatically over the past couple of years in the form of a protracted economic depression worldwide. The causes of this depression are essentially structural, as the likes of Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz and David Harvey point out repeatedly. The hyper-speculation that generated super-profits to sustain and expand the financial sector does not correspond to any actual productive activities or production that is measurable in terms of GDP or GNP. Anyone familiar with the economic history of the North Atlantic world over the past three decades is familiar with the astonishingly low levels of national income growth and the structural need for “bubbles” of speculation to temporarily forget the structural crisis at hand. The collusion between the knowledge factory and the global financial sector has been well-documented and justly criticized in recent months. But it isn’t stated often enough that particular theories and models emanating from the quiet groves of academia were, in fact, responsible for the unseemly rush to collude with the financial sector, and subsequently, to bring about the worst economic crisis in the postwar era. The delicate underbelly of the golden goose has now been gently slit open. It is only a matter of time before the creature, gasping for breath at the moment, dies and the golden eggs of the capitalist economy cease to be laid. Whenever that auspicious hour arrives, we shall see the end of the unholy nexus between financial speculators and their economics-trained numerologists/astrologers. In the short run, there is thus much to be hopeful: on the horizon is a wholesale renegotiation of the social relations of production in the capitalist economy as well as in the knowledge factory. How exactly these future developments will affect the seminar mode of production is anyone’s guess, but I, for one, am confident that snobs, prudes, and wannabe feudal lords will not vanish into thin air like the hard-earned salaries of so many capitalist workers. The medieval past thus seeps into the post-modern future in insidious ways long after it has outlived its usefulness.